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Abstract
The price of investment relative to consumption has steadily declined in the United States
over the last three decades. Over the same period, inequality at the top of the wealth
distribution has increased substantially. This paper develops a framework that allows to
associate these two trends. Households are modeled as entrepreneurs who accumulate cap-
ital, and are subject to persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. In this environment,
the decline in the relative price of investment benefits productive entrepreneurs more than
unproductive ones, increasing the saving rate differential between them. In turn, this in-
creases wealth inequality. In a version of the model calibrated to match the observed degree
of wealth concentration in the United States in 1980, the proposed mechanism can account
for half of the increase in wealth inequality observed over the last thirty years.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
The price of investment relative to consumption has decreased sharply in the United States
over the last three decades. Some important macroeconomic phenomena have been ex-
plained in light of this decline as reflecting investment-specific technological change. Green-
wood, Hercowitz, and Krusell (1997) consider the impact on growth, Krusell, Ohanian,
R´ıos-Rull, and Violante (2000) argue that it has caused an increase in wage inequality,
whereas Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) show that it has caused a decline in the labor
share of income. This paper contributes to this literature by studying the implications of
the decline in the relative price of investment on wealth inequality.
What motivates this line of inquiry is the substantial increase in concentration at the
top of the wealth distribution that has occurred in the United States since the 1980s, as
documented by Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus (2015) and Saez and Zucman
(2016). For instance, these papers estimate that the share of wealth owned by the 1%
wealthiest households in United States increased, from 1989 to 2013, by 7 and 15 percentage
points, respectively.
To study the effect of the declining price of investment on wealth inequality, this paper
considers a framework in which households act as entrepreneurs who accumulate capital,
and are subject to persistent idiosyncratic productivity shocks. The adoption of this en-
vironment allows the paper to model a meaningful degree of wealth concentration and to
investigate its evolution.
The main finding of this paper is that, in a calibrated version of the model that matches
1
2the observed wealth distribution of the United States in 1980, the decline in the price of
investment can account for half of the increase in wealth inequality observed over the last
three decades in the United States.
The increase in wealth inequality is driven in part by a redistributive effect that the
decline in the price of investment causes across heterogeneously productive households. In
fact, as the price of investment declines, productive households that increase their capital
stock can purchase investment goods more cheaply. On the other hand, for unproductive
households that disinvest, purchasing a given amount of consumption becomes more costly.
The key mechanism driving the increase in wealth inequality is a change in saving
behavior across households with different productivity types. In fact, in response to the
drop in price, productive households increase their saving rate more than unproductive
households.
This paper relates to the literature that studies the causes and modeling of wealth
inequality,1 and more specifically, to a strand of literature that explores the role of en-
trepreneurship in generating wealth mobility and inequality, which has its seminal con-
tributions in Quadrini (1999, 2000) and Cagetti and De Nardi (2006). This paper builds
on a paradigm of wealth inequality that is based on capital income risk, in the spirit of
Angeletos (2007) and Benhabib, Bisin, and Zhu (2011, 2014). These authors show that,
in different classes of models, when returns to wealth are heterogeneous, the stationary
wealth distribution has a heavy tail that can match the observed wealth distribution in
the United States. On the empirical side of this literature, Fagereng, Guiso, Malacrino,
and Pistaferri (2015) use administrative Norwegian data to provide evidence of persistent
heterogeneity in returns. Moskowitz and Vissing-Jørgensen (2002) show that returns on
private equity are also highly dispersed because of a strong lack of diversification.2
Finally, this paper contributes to recent literature that investigates the causes of the
increase in wealth inequality of the last three decades. Kaymak and Poschke (2016), in the
context of an Aiyagari model in the fashion of Castan˜eda, Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull
1In the context of an Aiyagari (1994) model—where the only source of risk is the labor endowment—
several mechanisms have been explored. This literature studies, among others, heterogeneity in patience,
bequest motives, human capital transmission across generations, and a high-risk earning process. For a
survey, see De Nardi (2015).
2Benhabib and Bisin (2016) offer a detailed discussion about the theoretical and empirical background
of this strand of literature.
3(2003), find that the changes in the United States tax system can account for half of the rise
in wealth concentration. Hubmer, Krusell, and Smith (2015) build a model with capital
income risk, heterogeneity in patience, and a very positively skewed income process. Under
this model, the decrease in tax progressivity can explain most of the change in the wealth
distribution observed in the United States. Gabaix, Lasry, Lions, and Moll (2015) argue
that models with capital income risk are a better candidate to explain wealth inequality
because they can generate transition dynamics that are as fast as the changes in wealth
concentration observed in the United States data.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Chapter 2 discusses the data on the price
of investment, and on wealth inequality, that are relevant to this paper. Chapter 3 lays out
the benchmark model. Chapter 4 considers a simpler two-period version of the benchmark
model to develop the intuition for the effect of the decline in the price of investment on
capital accumulation. Chapter 5 calibrates the model and presents the main quantitative
results of the paper. Chapter 6 tests the robustness of the results to departures from the
baseline calibration and assumptions. Chapter 8 concludes.
Chapter 2
Data
This chapter presents the data that are relevant for this paper. The first part shows the
data on the decline in the relative price of investment goods in the United States. The
second part illustrates the data on wealth inequality.
Relative Price of Investment Goods
The national income and product accounts (NIPA) report the price deflator for several
categories of investment. The price for each of these categories relative to consumption is
computed using these deflators.
Since the benchmark model lumps together all types of investment, in the data the
relative price of investment goods is computed as the ratio between the deflator of fixed
investment and the deflator of personal consumption expenditure. Over the period 1980
to 2010, this relative price exhibits a decline of 27%.
NIPA controls for quality improvement when calculating quantities and prices of its
accounts. The work of Gordon (1990), however, shows that NIPA understates quality
improvement, and therefore the decline in the relative price of investment is understated.
To correct this bias, DiCecio (2009) extrapolates the quality-adjusted price time series
of Gordon (1990) to 2010, using the same technique of Cummins and Violante (2002)
and Fisher (2006). This paper adopts the extrapolated time series of Gordon (1990) as a
benchmark. When controlling for quality improvements, the relative price of investment
4
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All the time series in this figure are normalized to 1 in 1980. The Gordon time series is computed by
DiCecio (2009), extrapolating the quality-adjusted series of Gordon (1990). The figure shows the price of
investment relative to the price of consumption. The NIPA series is obtained as the ratio between the
deflator of fixed investment and the deflator of personal consumption expenditure.
goods declined by 44% from 1980 to 2010.
Figure 2.1 concludes this chapter by showing the time series of the relative price of
investment.
Wealth Inequality
In this paper the word wealth refers to household net worth in the United States. To
measure inequality at the top of the wealth distribution, this paper considers the share of
wealth owned by the x% wealthiest households in the distribution, which is referred to as
Top x%.
Since taxes are not levied on wealth in the United States,1 there is no administrative
data set on wealth holdings. For this reason, the primary data source on wealth is a cross-
sectional survey data set: the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF). The SCF oversamples
income-rich households to obtain a good representation of wealthy households. However,
the nonresponse rate increases in the high-income strata, a problem that can be corrected
for only in part with an appropriate system of weights (Kennickell and Woodburn, 1999).
1A notable exeption is estate taxation.
6To address concerns about non response and to obtain as detailed a picture of the
top of the wealth distribution as possible, several scholars have proposed alternative ways
to study wealth concentration at the top. Kopczuk and Saez (2004) use administrative
data on estate taxation and Vermeulen (2014) corrects SCF estimates of inequality by
including the net worth of the members of the Forbes 400 list, who are by construction
excluded from sampling in the SCF. Finally, in an influential paper, Saez and Zucman
(2016) use administrative data on capital income taxation to reconstruct wealth holdings
by capitalizing the flow of capital income.
These different data sources sometimes produce very different estimates of the level
and trend of wealth inequality in the United States. Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and
Sabelhaus (2015) argue that the estimates produced using the SCF are of high quality,
and that a large part of the difference between these estimates and the figures of Saez and
Zucman (2016) can be explained as conceptual differences between the object measured
using these two data sources.
Bricker et al. (2015), over the period 1989 to 2013, find a 7 percentage points increase in
the Top 1%, of which 3 percentage points accrued to the Top 0.1%. Over the same period of
time, Saez and Zucman (2016) find a sharper change, with a 15 percentage points increase
in the Top 1%, of which 13 percentage points accrued to the Top 0.1%. Using the SCF,
Wolff (2014) finds that the Gini coefficient of wealth increased by 7 percentage points in
the period 1983 to 2013.
In light of this discussion, the strategy of this paper is to use the estimates produced
using the SCF by Bricker et al. (2015) and Wolff (2014) as a benchmark. The statistics of
Saez and Zucman (2016) are used as a supplement to the SCF estimates and as an upper
bound to gauge the increase in wealth inequality.
Figure 2.2 concludes this chapter and shows the time series describing the trend in
wealth inequality at the top of the distribution.
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The time series in these figures are computed by Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus (2015) and
Saez and Zucman (2016). The left panel shows the Top 1%, the share of household net worth owned by
the wealthiest 1% of households in the United States. The right panel shows the Top 0.1%, the share of
household net worth owned by the wealthiest 0.1% of households in the United States.
Chapter 3
Model
This chapter develops a model for studying the impact of the declining relative price of
investment on wealth inequality. Throughout the paper, the model introduced in this
chapter is referred to as the benchmark model. After presenting the benchmark model, this
chapter describes the notion of equilibrium for the model. The last part of the chapter
presents a simplified two-period version of the benchmark model that is used to discuss
the forces at work in the benchmark model as the relative price of investment declines.
To have a meaningful discussion of wealth inequality, this chapter draws on a model
environment that can reproduce the degree of wealth concentration observed in the United
States, where each household is an entrepreneur with stochastic idiosyncratic productivity.
This class of models is appealing because the decline in the price of investment interacts
in a significant way with the saving decision, therefore affecting wealth inequality.
Time is discrete and the horizon is infinite, t = 1, 2, . . .. There is a continuum of
measure one of households indexed by i. There are three layers—optimization problems—
to this economy: (i) A household supplies labor and owns a monopolistically competitive
firm producing one good variety. (ii) The final good producer competitively aggregates
good varieties and labor to produce a final good. (iii) Investment and consumption goods
are produced competitively using the final good as an input.
In what follows, the description of the model begins with the problem of the final
good producer and of the consumption and investment goods producers. This chapter first
characterizes the competitive price functions from these optimization problems, and then
8
9presents the household problem.
Final Good Producer
An individual household is denoted using index i. Let yi,t be the quantity of goods produced
by household i at time t.
The final good producer uses a Cobb-Douglas technology to produce the final good,
Yt = Q
α
t L
1−α
t .
Aggregate capital Qt is an aggregation of household varieties using a constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) production technology,
Qt =
(∫
i
yµi,t
) 1
µ
.
Let us denote by µ the CES curvature parameter, which can also be expressed in terms
of the elasticity of substitution (ES) between varieties as µ = (ES− 1) /ES. The capital
share of income is α.
The final good producer solves the following problem:
max
{yi,t}i,Lt
Yt − wtLt −
∫
i
yi,tpi,t,
where w denotes the wage rate and p denotes the price of a good variety. This implies
price functions
wt = (1− α)Qαt L−αt ,
pi,t = L
1−α
t αQ
−µ+α
t y
µ−1
i,t .
Consumption and Investment Good Producers
The consumption good producer uses a linear technology that turns one unit of the final
good into one unit of the consumption good Ct = Y
c
t .
Let px denote the price of one unit of the investment good. The investment good
10
producer uses a linear technology that turns one unit of the final good into Axt units of the
investment good Xt. Therefore, it solves
max
Y xt
Xtp
x
t − Y xt
subject to
Xt = Y
x
t A
x
t .
Hence pxt = 1/A
x
t . This modeling strategy implies that the relative price of investment
is driven entirely by investment-specific production efficiency. In the study of transitional
dynamics, Axt changes exogenously.
Households
Let k denote capital and θ the entrepreneurial type. The entrepreneurial type of the
household evolves according to an AR(1) process. Each household operates a firm with
its capital stock and its entrepreneurial type, earning profit pi (k, θ). Capital depreciates
at rate δ, and investment is denoted by x. Each household provides one unit of labor
inelastically.
The Bellman equation of household i is
Vt (ki,t, θi,t; p
x
t , Qt, wt) = max
ci,t,ki,t+1,xi,t
{
u (ci,t) + βEVt+1
(
ki,t+1, θi,t+1; p
x
t+1, Qt+1, wt+1
)}
subject to
ci,t + xi,tp
x
t = wt + pi (ki,t, θi,t) ,
xi,t = ki,t+1 − ki,t (1− δ) ,
log θi,t+1 = ρ log θi,t + εi,t,
with ki,t+1 ≥ 0, ci,t > 0, and εi,t ∼ N (0, σ). Each household operates a firm that employs
a linear technology
yi,t = θi,tki,t
11
and earns profit pi given by
pi (ki,t, θi,t) = yi,tpi,t,
= αQ−µ+αt (θi,tki,t)
µ . (3.1)
Notice that these equations incorporate the market-clearing condition Lt = 1.
Since the household runs a monopolistically competitive firm, if µ < 1, it faces decreas-
ing marginal profits. The curvate parameter µ governs the rate at which marginal profits
decline. Declining marginal profits imply that the distribution of capital is stationary on
a bounded support.
Equation 3.1 also shows that aggregate capital Qt feeds into the firm profit. This
has interesting implications because, as the price of investment declines, aggregate capital
increases. Chapters 4 and 5 consider in more detail the consequences of an increase in
aggregate capital on household capital income.
Market Clearing
Two markets need to clear in this model: the market for consumption and investment
goods,
Yt = Y
c
t + Y
x
t ,
=
∫
i
ci,t +
xi,t
Axt
,
and the labor market, ∫
i
li,t = Lt = 1.
Equilibrium
In this economy, idiosyncratic uncertainty washes out at the aggregate. Consequently
there is no aggregate uncertainty. For this reason, aggregate quantities and prices follow
a deterministic path. Households choose optimal contingent plans that at the equilibrium
are consistent with the aggregate path. More formally, a competitive equilibrium for
this economy is as follows:
12
(i) exogenous sequence {Axt },
(ii) sequence of prices {pxt , wt} and quantities {Qt},
(iii) collection of contingent household plans {ci,t, xi,t, ki,t+1},
that satisfy the following conditions:
(1) given prices and quantities {ci,t, xi,t, ki,t+1} solve the household problem,
(2) prices {pxt , wt, pi,t} are competitive,
(3) markets clear,
(4) aggregation holds.
A stationary competitive equilibrium is a competitive equilibrium such that {Axt , pxt , Qt, wt}
are constant and the measure of households over (kt, θt) is constant.
Chapter 4
Simple Model
In the benchmark model, investment-specific technological progress decreases the price of
investment; that is, as Axt increases, p
x
t = 1/A
x
t decreases.
This chapter considers the effect of a drop in the price of investment on wealth inequal-
ity. The reason why, in this model, a drop in price can affect wealth inequality is that
agents with heterogeneous productivity types respond differently to a drop in pxt .
To see why this type of asymmetric effect is important, consider what happens if the
decline in the price provides incentives to increase saving that are stronger for more produc-
tive agents. Because in this model more productive agents are wealthier and have higher
saving rates on average, a further increase in their saving rates increases wealth inequality.
Since in the benchmark model, household wealth is in the form of capital, capital ac-
cumulation uniquely determines the evolution of wealth inequality. For this reason, this
chapter considers a two-period model of capital accumulation that is based on a simplifi-
cation of the benchmark model, which is referred to as the simple model.
The simplifying assumptions are the following: (i) There is no labor income. (ii) Capital
income takes the form kθφ, where θ is the idiosyncratic productivity type of the agent and
φ is the component of return to capital that is common to all agents, net of depreciation.
Under these assumptions, and suppressing all time and individual subscripts, the budget
13
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equations of the benchmark model simplify to
c+ xp = kθφ,
k′ = k + x,
so that
x =
θφk − c
p
=
θφk
p
(
1− c
θφk
)
= k
θφ
p
s,
where s = 1 − c/θφk is the saving rate of the agent. Notice that s < 1 because the agent
can save at most all of her income. Furthermore, since the agent can dissave at most all of
her capital, it follows that s > −p/ (θφ). Finally, the law of motion for capital is
k′ = k
(
1 +
θφs
p
)
. (4.1)
The law of motion for capital in the simple model is used to measure the effect of a
drop in the price of investment on k′ and whether this effect differs across productivity
types.
Let us consider two types of effect: (i) The direct effect is the change in k′ caused by
the drop in pxt , while holding fixed the saving rate. This effect is direct because it occurs
without affecting the saving rates. (ii) The incentive effect is the effect that occurs on k′
when the agent changes her saving rate in response to a drop in pxt . This effect quantifies
the change in the agents’ incentives to save in response to the drop in price.
The Effect of the Price of Investment
Previewing the results, this chapter finds that the incentive effect is positive and increasing
in the household type. Therefore, when the price of investment drops more productive
agents have stronger incentives to increase their saving rates.
Let us describe the direct effect of a decline in the price of investment on capital
accumulation using the following elasticity:
Ep = ∂ log k
′
−∂ log p =
θφs
p+ θφs
, (4.2)
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Figure 4.1: The Direct Effect of the Drop in Price of Investment
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This figure illustrates the direct effect of the drop in price, Ep. This represents by what percentage accu-
mulated capital varies in response to a 1% drop in price. The direct effect is positive and increasing in θ if
s > 0, whereas it is negative and decreasing in θ if s < 0.
which measures by what percentage accumulated capital changes tomorrow following a 1%
drop in price today. Notice that measuring the relative effect—as opposed to the effect in
levels—is the correct strategy for gauging the effect on wealth inequality because wealth
inequality is measured as the degree of relative dispersion in wealth.
Let us consider the sign of Ep. Since s > −p/ (θφ), the denominator is always positive.
Since θ and φ are positive, Ep is positive if s > 0. Furthermore, Ep is increasing in θ if
s > 0 and decreasing otherwise. Figure 4.1 illustrates this by plotting Ep as a function of
θ for three different values of s.
As the figure shows, there are two scenarios based on whether the saving rate is positive
or negative. For an agent who is increasing her capital holding, the decline in price entails
a positive direct effect because as p declines, the same amount of capital income θφs
purchases more capital. In this scenario, a more productive agent stands to benefit more
from the drop in price because she has more capital income to purchase capital. When
s < 0, the direct effect is negative because to purchase a given amount of consumption,
more capital needs to be dissaved.
The direct effect is therefore ambiguous with respect to θ. In fact, whether Ep is
increasing or decreasing depends on s, which in the benchmark model is endogenous and
16
Figure 4.2: The Incentive Effect of the Drop in the Price of Investment
θ
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
E
p s
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
s = 1/2
s = 0
s = −1/2
This figure illustrates the incentive effect of the drop in price, Eps . This represents—in percentage terms—the
effect on capital accumulation of an increase in the saving rate, in response to a 1% drop in price. The
effect is positive and increasing in θ.
itself a function of θ.1
The next step is to consider the incentive effect, that is, the effect of a drop in p on the
incentives to save. Let us describe the incentive effect using the following derivative:
Eps =
∂Ep
∂s
=
pφθ
(p+ θφs)2
, (4.3)
which measures—in percentage terms—the effect on capital accumulation of an increase in
the saving rate in response to a 1% drop in price. Figure 4.2 illustrates this by plotting Eps
as a function of θ for three different values of s.
Equation 4.3 shows that Eps is positive, meaning that increasing saving magnifies the
effect of the drop in price on capital accumulation. Therefore, the drop in price provides
an incentive to increase saving across the board. Furthermore, Eps is an increasing function
of θ. This implies that the incentives to increase saving are stronger for more productive
agents; that is, the incentive effect is stronger for more productive agents. In turn, this
increases wealth inequality because in the benchmark model productive households on
average are wealthier and have higher saving rates.
1In the benchmark model, the saving rate is monotonically increasing in the productivity type. Sec-
tion 5.3 shows that the direct effect of the drop in the price causes wealth inequality to increase.
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In accordance with the intuition that Equation 4.3 helps develop, Section 5.3 shows
that, in the benchmark model, the change in wealth inequality is mostly caused by the
change in the saving behavior of the agents.
The Effect of Aggregate Capital
In the benchmark model, profit has the following functional form:
pi (ki,t, θi,t) = αQ
α−µ
t θ
µ
i,tk
µ
i,t, (4.4)
and therefore decreases in Qt if α < µ, where α represents the capital income share in the
economy, and the parameter µ governs the returns to scale of the household’s firm. When
µ = 1 the firm has constant marginal profits, whereas µ < 1 implies decreasing marginal
profits. The calibration exercise of Section 5.1 shows that the empirically relevant case is
α < µ. Therefore capital income is decreasing in aggregate capital.
As investment becomes cheaper, households accumulate more capital, causing Qt to
increase. In light of the discussion about Equation 4.4, as aggregate capital increases,
marginal profit decreases across the board for all households.
In the context of the simple model, where capital income is written as kθφ, a decline
in φ captures an increase in Qt.
Following the same steps as in the previous chapter, let us study the effect of the
decline in φ on capital accumulation. The direct effect is measured by what percentage
accumulated capital varies following a 1% drop in φ, using the following elasticity:
Eφ = ∂ log k
′
−∂ log φ = −
θφs
p+ θφs
. (4.5)
Figure 4.3 illustrates Eφ as a function of θ for three different values of s. If s > 0, then Eφ
is negative and decreasing in θ, whereas if s < 0, Eφ is positive and increasing in θ. The
direct effect is therefore ambiguous with respect to θ.
The following derivative describes the incentive effect:
Eφs =
∂Eφ
∂s
= − pφθ
(p+ θφs)2
, (4.6)
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which measures—in percentage terms—the effect on capital accumulation of an increase in
the saving rate in response to a 1% drop in φ. Figure 4.4 illustrates Eφs as a function of θ
for different values of s. Equation 4.6 shows that Eφs is negative. This provides an incentive
to decrease saving across the board. Also in this case, the effect is heterogeneous across
productivity types. In particular, Eφs is a decreasing function of θ, so that the incentive to
dissave is greater for agents who are more productive.
This last point is important to understand how an increase in aggregate capital affects
wealth inequality. In fact, more productive households have incentives to decrease their
saving rates that are stronger than for less productive households. This decreases wealth
inequality because it compresses the saving rate differential between productive and unpro-
ductive households. In fact, Section 5.3 shows that, in the benchmark model, the increase
in aggregate capital decreases wealth inequality.
Wealth Inequality
The discussion of the simple model shows that the decline in the price of investment and the
increase in aggregate capital have asymmetric effects on agents with different productivity
types.
In particular, the decline in price provides stronger incentives to increase saving for more
productive agents. This effect can increase wealth inequality in a model of entrepreneurship
because more productive agents operate bigger firms, are wealthier, and have higher saving
rates. On the other hand, an increase in aggregate capital can decrease wealth inequality
because it provides incentives to decrease saving that are stronger for more productive
agents.
This intuition is based on the two-period time horizon and on the set of simplifying
assumptions of the simple model. Chapter 5 considers the quantitative solution of the
benchmark model and uses the intuition gained from the simple model to analyze the
results. Drawing a parallel with the simple model, it isolates the direct effect of the decline
in price and finds that it increases wealth inequality. However, the incentive effect of the
decline in price is the main driver of the quantitative result of this paper. In fact, wealth
inequality increases because of a change in saving behavior as the price of investment
declines.
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Figure 4.3: The Direct Effect of the Increase in Aggregate Capital
θ
0 0.5 1 1.5 2
E
φ
-0.2
0
0.2
0.4
s = 1/2
s = 0
s = −1/2
This figure illustrates the direct effect of an increase in aggregate capital, represented as a drop in φ, that
is, Eφ. The direct effect is positive and increasing in θ if s < 0, whereas it is negative and decreasing in θ
if s > 0.
Figure 4.4: The Incentive Effect of the Increase in Aggregate Capital
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This figure illustrates the incentive effect of the increase in aggregate capital represented as a drop in φ,
that is, Eφs . The incentive effect is negative and decreasing in θ.
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Both the direct effect and the incentive effect of the increase in aggregate capital work
in the direction of decreasing wealth inequality. Also in this case the incentive effect is the
more important.
Interestingly, the increase in Qt occurs more slowly than the decline in p
x
t , so that
in the benchmark model, wealth inequality increases for the first three decades and then
decreases again, reverting to levels that are comparable with those of the initial stationary
equilibrium.
Chapter 5
Quantitative Results
This chapter calibrates the model and presents the main quantitative results of this paper.
The purpose of this quantitative exercise is to study the consequences of the decline in the
price of investment on wealth inequality and to compare the model predictions with the
path of wealth inequality observed in the United States from 1980 to 2010.
To accomplish this, the model is calibrated so that in the stationary equilibrium, it
matches several characteristics of the United States economy in 1980. Then the declining
time series of the relative price of investment—shown in Figure 2.1—is fed into the model.
In this exercise, once the agents learn about the new declining path of the price of in-
vestment, they have perfect foresight. Section 6.1 considers the robustness of the model’s
implications for the perfect foresight assumption.
As the economy responds to the decline in the price of investment, wealth inequality
increases over the transition to the new stationary equilibrium. The model can account for
approximately half of the increase in wealth inequality observed in the United States from
1989 to 2013, as measured by the SCF.
5.1 Calibration
This chapter calibrates the model. Throughout the paper, this calibration of the model is
referred to as the benchmark calibration. Each period in the model corresponds to a year.
Table 5.1 reports the parameters of the model that are calibrated independently, whereas
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Table 5.2 reports the parameters that are jointly calibrated to match the data moments
reported in Table 5.3.
Preferences
Let us assume a constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function, with relative risk
aversion (RRA) of 2. The discount rate β is calibrated to generate a wealth-over-output
ratio of 3 in the stationary equilibrium. The calibrated value of β is 0.93.
Entrepreneurial Skills
Entrepreneurial skills of the household evolve according to an AR(1) process. The param-
eters that govern this process are the autocorrelation, ρ, and the standard deviation of the
innovation, σ. These two parameters are calibrated to match the moments of the distribu-
tion of wealth in the stationary equilibrium. The calibrated value of ρ is 0.98, whereas the
calibrated value of σ is 0.08.
Production and Capital Depreciation
Let us assume a capital share of income α of 0.35 and a capital depreciation rate δ of
0.04. The curvature parameter µ determines how steeply decreasing marginal profits are,
and consequently the shape and moments of the wealth distribution. For this reason, µ
is jointly calibrated to match the moments of the wealth distribution in the stationary
equilibrium. The calibrated value of µ is 0.86.
Moments of the Wealth Distribution
In the benchmark model the household’s only asset is capital. Therefore, household wealth
equals the current value of the household’s stock of capital. To ensure that the wealth
distribution in the stationary equilibrium is close to the 1980 wealth distribution in the
United States, the calibration targets the following moments: a wealth share of 1% for the
bottom four deciles of the wealth distribution, as reported by Wolff (2014) for the 1983
SCF; a Gini coefficient of wealth of 80%, as reported by Wolff (2014) in 1983. For the
Top 1%, the figures reported in the years close to 1980 differ substantially across different
23
sources. Wolff (2014) reports 34% in the year 1983, Saez and Zucman (2016) find a value
of 24% in the year 1980, and Bricker, Henriques, Krimmel, and Sabelhaus (2015) report a
value of 30% in 1989. Therefore, the calibration targets a value of 30%, in the middle of
this range. Finally, for the Top 0.1% and Top 0.01%, let us target the values of Saez and
Zucman (2016), 8% and 3%, respectively. Table 5.3 summarizes the information on the
moments and the performance of the model.
5.2 Transition
This section shows the main quantitative results of the benchmark model. In 1980 the
modeled economy is in the stationary equilibrium. Then, agents learn about the future
declining path of the price of investment, and with perfect foresight, they acquire knowl-
edge of the future path of all the aggregate prices and quantities of the economy. In the
benchmark exercise, the price of investment declines as shown in Figure 2.1 and remains
constant after 2013 for the rest of the transition. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of aggre-
gate prices and quantities. As investment becomes cheaper, aggregate capital Qt increases,
therefore increasing wt.
Table 5.4 shows different measures of wealth inequality from 1989 to 2013, comparing
the output of the model with the SCF data. The model can account for half of the increase
in wealth inequality at the top of the wealth distribution, as shown by the Top 0.1% and
the Top 1% shares. The model also captures half of the increase in more global measures
of wealth inequality such as the Gini coefficient and the Top 10%. Figure 5.2 shows in
more detail the time series of these measures of wealth inequality comparing the SCF with
the model transition.
5.3 Decomposition
Chapter 4 developed the intuition for the asymmetric effect of the decline in the price
of investment on heterogeneously productive households. This section uses the intuition
gained from the simple model to analyze the effect on wealth inequality presented in the
transition of the benchmark model.
Drawing a parallel with the simple model, this section decomposes the effect in two
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Table 5.1: Benchmark Parameters Calibrated Independently
Parameter Value
Capital depreciation δ 0.04
Capital share in production α 0.35
Relative risk aversion RRA 2
This table lists the parameters of the benchmark model that are calibrated independently.
Table 5.2: Benchmark Parameters Calibrated Jointly in Equilibrium
Parameter Value
Discount factor β 0.93
Curvature parameter of the aggregator µ 0.86
Std. dev. of entrepreneurial ability σ 0.08
Persistence of entrepreneurial ability ρ 0.98
This table lists the parameters of the benchmark model that are calibrated jointly to match in the initial
stationary equilibrium the moments reported in Table 5.3.
Table 5.3: Data and Benchmark Model Moments
Targets Data Model
Bottom 40% share of wealth 0.01 0.02
Top 1% share of wealth 0.30 0.33
Top 0.1% share of wealth 0.08 0.10
Top 0.01% share of wealth 0.03 0.03
Gini of Wealth 0.80 0.83
Wealth/Output 3.00 3.00
This table summarizes the joint calibration exercise. The data column reports the targets of the calibration,
whereas the model column reports the moments of the calibrated model. The calibrated parameters that
generate the model moments are reported in Table 5.2.
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Figure 5.1: Aggregates
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All the time series in this figure are normalized to 1 in 1980. This is a plot of the aggregate prices and
quantities over the transition. The time series for pxt is fed into the model, whereas Qt and wt are the result
of general equilibrium.
Table 5.4: Measures of Wealth Inequality: Data and Model
Change from 1989 to 2013
SCF Model
Top 0.1% 3 pp 2 pp
Top 1% 7 pp 3 pp
Top 10% 8 pp 4 pp
Gini% 4 pp 3 pp
This table compares the output from the benchmark model with the data from the SCF. The results are
displayed in percentage points (pp) differences. The model accounts on average for half of the rise in wealth
inequality observed in the SCF. The 1980 calibration of the model that generates this output is reported
in Tables 5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. Figure 5.2 plots in detail the time series of these statistics comparing the SCF
with the model transition.
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Figure 5.2: Measures of Wealth Inequality: Data and Model
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This figure compares the output from the benchmark model with the data from the SCF. Each panel of the
figure shows a different statistic of wealth inequality, comparing the SCF time series with the time series
generated by the model over the transition. The model accounts on average for half of the rise in wealth
inequality observed in the SCF. The 1980 calibration that generates this output is reported in Tables 5.1,
5.2 and 5.3. Table 5.4 shows a direct comparison of the change in the different statistics of wealth inequality
from 1989 to 2013.
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ways. (i) In the first part of the experiment, the saving rates are fixed over the state
space at the 1980 levels. Then, the economy is simulated again, allowing the aggregates
to vary as in the transition of the benchmark model. This isolates the direct effect on
wealth inequality caused by the changing aggregates, while the saving behavior remains
fixed. (ii) In the second part of the experiment, the aggregates are fixed at the levels of
1980. Then, the economy is simulated again, allowing the saving rates to vary as in the
transition of the benchmark model. This isolates the incentive effect on wealth inequality
caused by the changing saving behavior, while the aggregates remain fixed. Notice that
these decomposition exercises, though informative, are not additive.
The decomposition exercise takes the following steps. The model is solved over the
transition, and the aggregates {pxt , wt, Qt}Tt=1980 and policy functions {gk (k, θ, t)}Tt=1980
are stored. T denotes the last period of the transition. Using the policy functions, the
optimal saving rates are computed as
gs (k, θ, t) =
{gk (k, θ, t)− k (1− δ)} pxt
wt + αQ
−µ+α
t (θk)
µ ,
where the numerator is investment and the denominator is income in the benchmark model.
Notice that the sequence of policy functions is indexed by time to highlight that, over the
transition, the policy functions depend on the path of the aggregates.
Direct Effect
The first part of the experiment studies the direct effect on wealth inequality. Saving rates
are fixed at their 1980 levels, that is, gs (k, θ, t) = gs (k, θ, 1980). New policy functions are
computed, based on the fixed saving rates, as the aggregates change:
gˆk (k, θ, t) = gs (k, θ, 1980)
{
wt + αQ
−µ+α
t (θk)
µ
}
/pxt + k (1− δ) .
The new policy functions are used to simulate a new transition path for the economy.
Figure 5.3 shows the evolution of the Gini and Top 1% share of wealth, while only one
aggregate at a time changes. The direct effect of the decline in the price of investment is
to increase wealth inequality, whereas the increase in wage and aggregate capital decreases
wealth concentration.
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Figure 5.3: Direct Effect, One Aggregate at a Time
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This figure shows the result of a decomposition exercise. The saving rates of the agents are fixed at the
levels of 1980. Then the transition is recomputed, allowing only one aggregate at a time to change. For
any such experiment, this figure illustrates the evolution of the Gini and Top 1% share of wealth. Next
to each time series is marked which of the three aggregates changes when the transition is recomputed.
For example, the blue line in the left panel represents the evolution of the Gini of wealth when only Qt
increases.
Figure 5.4 considers the combined direct effect of all the aggregates, comparing it
with the output of the benchmark model. The figure shows that the direct effects of the
aggregates tend to cancel each other out. In conclusion, the direct effect of the aggregates
is to increase wealth inequality, although the size of the effect is small.
Incentive Effect
The second part of the experiment considers the incentive effect, which works through the
change in the saving behavior. To do this, the aggregates are fixed, that is, Qt = Q1980 p
x
t =
px1980 and wt = w1980. New policy functions are obtained based on the fixed aggregates,
while the saving rates are allowed to change:
gˆk (k, θ, t) = gs (k, θ, t)
{
w1980 + αQ
−µ+α
1980 (θk)
µ
}
/px1980 + k (1− δ) .
A new transition is computed using the new policy functions. Figure 5.5 shows the evolution
of the Gini and the Top 1% share of wealth as the saving behavior of the agents changes.
A comparison of this figure with Figure 5.4 shows that most of the increase in wealth
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inequality is driven by the incentive effect.
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Figure 5.4: Direct Effect, All Aggregates
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This figure shows the result of a decomposition exercise. The saving rates of the agents are fixed at the
levels of 1980. Then the transition is recomputed, allowing all the aggregates to change contemporaneously,
as shown in Figure 5.1. This figure plots the Gini and the Top 1% share of wealth from this experiment (in
blue) and compares it with the output generated by the benchmark model (in red).
Figure 5.5: Incentive Effect
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This figure shows the result of a decomposition exercise. All the aggregates are fixed at the levels of 1980.
The transition is recomputed, allowing the saving rates of the agents to change, as in the transition of the
benchmark model. The Gini and the Top 1% share of wealth from this experiment are represented in black
and compared with the output of the benchmark model in red.
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5.4 Saving Behavior
The decomposition in Section 5.3 illustrates that the change in the household’s saving
behavior causes most of the increase in wealth inequality. This section analyzes the change
in saving behavior in more detail.
In what follows, the saving rate of a household is defined as the share of income that it
spends to purchase investment goods:
s (θi,t, ki,t) =
xi,tp
x
t
wt + αQ
−µ+α
t (θi,tki,t)
µ .
The sign of s (θi,t, ki,t) is negative when the household decumulates capital in order to
purchase consumption.
The simple model of Chapter 4 shows that in response to the decline in the price of
investment, productive households have incentives to save more. To analyze this in the
benchmark model, let us compare the average saving rates across households with different
productivity types.
When solving the benchmark model numerically, the support for θ is discretized using
10 grid points. Let us denote the highest and lowest grid points as θH and θL, respectively.
The fifth point is denoted as θM , where M stands for medium. Then for j ∈ {L,M,H},
the average saving rate is defined as
st (θj) =
∫
i|θi,t=θj
s (θi,t, ki,t) .
To show the divergence of the saving rates across household types, Figure 5.6 represents
s (θH) − s (θM ) and s (θH) − s (θL). The figure shows that these time series are fanning
out, therefore increasing wealth inequality across types.
In the figure, the differences in saving rates at the initial stationary equilibrium of 1980
are marked on the left vertical axis. Then, as the households learn about the new path of
aggregates they face, they reoptimize and change their saving behavior.
To understand the effect on wealth accumulation of different types of households, let
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us consider average capital holding by household type, which is denoted as
Kt (θj) =
∫
i|θi,t=θj
ki,t,
so that average capital holding across all households is denoted Kt. Figure 5.7 plots the
log changes of Kt (θj) using 1980 as the reference year, that is, logKt (θj)− logK1980 (θj).
The figure shows that the capital holding of different types of households fans out over the
transition.
Figure 5.6: Fanning Out of Saving Rates
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This figure shows the difference between the average saving rate of θH , θM , and θL households, that is,
s (θH)− s (θM ) and s (θH)− s (θL). The markers on the vertical axis indicate the value of s (θH)− s (θM )
and s (θH)− s (θL) in the 1980 stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 5.7: Average Capital Holding
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This figure displays the log changes in average capital holding by household type. The types are θH , θM ,
and θL. All the time series are normalized in 1980, so that for type j the time series is computed as
logKt (θj) − logK1980 (θj). The figure also shows the log changes in average capital holding across all
types, that is, logKt − logK1980.
5.5 Wealth Inequality in the Long Run
This section considers the model long-run predictions for wealth inequality. The increase
in aggregate capital Qt plays an important role for these predictions. For this reason, the
discussion begins by considering the long-run time series of the aggregates in the benchmark
model, displayed in Figure 5.8.
The figure shows that aggregate capital increases the fastest precisely when the price
of investment stops decreasing. Qt then increases at a declining rate until it stabilizes at a
value of around three times Q1980.
Chapter 4 explores with the simple model the asymmetric effect of an increase in Qt on
heterogeneously productive households. It shows that an increase in Qt provides incentives
to decrease saving that are stronger for more productive agents. Furthermore, Section 5.3
shows that the direct effect of an increase in Qt is to decrease wealth inequality. Based
on these considerations, the increase in Qt has the potential to reduce wealth inequality in
the model.
In fact, Figure 5.9 shows that in the benchmark model, wealth inequality decreases in
the long run. The figure illustrates the same statistics of wealth inequality as in Figure 5.2
over a time horizon of 100 periods. A small triangle marks the value of each statistic at the
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Figure 5.8: Aggregates, Long Run
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All the time series in this figure are normalized to 1 in 1980. This is a plot of the aggregate prices and
quantities over the transition in the long run. The time series for pxt is fed into the model from 1980 to 2013
and then remains constant throughout the rest of the transition. Qt and wt are the result of the general
equilibrium.
final stationary equilibrium. This shows that, eventually, the degree of wealth concentration
returns to levels that are comparable with those of 1980.
Figure 5.10 illustrates average capital holding by household type in the long run. This
figure shows an increase in wealth dispersion across household types in the first three
decades. However, this increase in dispersion eventually vanishes.
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Figure 5.9: Measures of Wealth Inequality: Model, Long Run
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This figure presents the output from the benchmark model in the long run. Each panel of the figure shows
a different statistic of wealth inequality. The marker on the right vertical axis of each panel indicates the
value of the statistic at the final stationary equilibrium.
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Figure 5.10: Average Capital Holding, Long Run
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This figure displays the log changes in average capital holding by household type in the long run. The
types are θH , θM , and θL. All the time series are normalized in 1980, so that for type j the time series is
computed as logKt (θj) − logK1980 (θj). The figure also shows the log changes in average capital holding
across all types, that is, logKt − logK1980.
Chapter 6
Robustness
This chapter examines the robustness of the results of the benchmark model to departures
from the baseline calibration and assumptions.
6.1 Myopic Agents
In the benchmark model, in 1980 the agents acquire knowledge of the future path of all
the aggregates.
This section considers the evolution of wealth inequality in the model, when agents
do not have perfect foresight. To bound the effect between the two extreme cases, let us
consider the opposite of perfect foresight, that is, perfectly myopic agents.
In this version of the model, agents learn about the contemporaneous change in the price
of investment each period from 1980 to 2013, but do not anticipate the future declining price
path. In response to each surprising change the agents optimally choose new contingent
consumption and saving plans.
Figure 6.1 shows the evolution of the Gini and the Top 1% share of wealth over the tran-
sition, under the assumption that agents are perfectly myopic. To facilitate the comparison
with the benchmark model, the statistics of the benchmark model are also represented in
the graph. The figure shows that the effect on wealth inequality is dampened and that it
takes place with a slightly slower timing. In fact, wealth inequality peaks in 2013 instead
of 2010. In conclusion, assuming perfectly myopic agents does not affect the qualitative
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Figure 6.1: Myopic Agents
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This figure illustrates the result of a robustness exercise. Each panel of the figure shows a different statistic
of wealth inequality, comparing the output from the benchmark model with the time series generated by a
model where agents are perfectly myopic.
findings of the benchmark model, though it affects the size of the effect.
Chapter 7
Computational Solution
This chapter describes the computational strategy used to solve the the benchmark model.
Household Problem
The households problem is solved using the endogenous grid method (EGM) of Carroll
(2006). The states of the problem are cash-on-hand and the the productivity type of the
households.
The productivity type is discretized using Rouwenhorst (1995) using a discrete grid
with 10 gridpoints.
The support for capital, though bounded, is large, with an upper bound of 1020. For
this reason, the grid for capital is exponential, that is, the spacing between the grid points
grows exponentially. The model is solved with 200 gridpoint.
The interpolation necessary for the EGM is performed using cubic spline interpolation.
Stationary Equilibrium
This paper discusses statistics of the wealth distribution that can be reliably estimated only
if the distribution is computed very precisely. For this reason, the solution does not rely
on a simulation but solves directly for the stationary distribution. This section considers
the procedure to do this.
Let g (k, θ) denote the policy function that solves the households problem, and let θi
be the i-th element in the discrete grid for the type. The ergodic set for capital is bounded
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by nodes n1 and nN+1 such that g (n1, θ) > n1 for all θ and g (nN+1, θ) < nN+1 for all
θ. Then, a given assignment of nodes n1, n2, . . . , nN+1 defines bins bi, i = 1, . . . , N , where
x ∈ bi ⇐⇒ ni < x ≤ ni+1. Let Π denote the transition matrix associated with the
productivity type, with typical element Πj,k
Then the transition probability between any two points in the discrete state space is
given by
Pr
{
k′ ∈ bj ∧ θ′ = θk
∣∣ k ∈ bi ∧ θ = θh} ,
= Pr
{
θ′ = θk
∣∣ k ∈ bi ∧ θ = θh}× Pr{k′ ∈ bj∣∣ k ∈ bi ∧ θ = θh} ,
= Pr
{
θ′ = θk
∣∣ θ = θh}× Pr{k′ ∈ bj∣∣ k ∈ bi ∧ θ = θh} ,
= Πh,k × Pr {nj < g (k, θh) ≤ nj+1| k ∈ bi} ,
= Πh,k ×
min
{
ni+1, g
−1 (nj+1, θh)
}−max{ni, g−1 (nj , θh)}
nj+1 − nj ,
where the last line comes from assuming that within each bin the distribution is uniform.
Computing the transition probability between any two point in the discrete type-bin state
space completes the description of a first order Markov process, whose stationary distri-
bution can be obtained directly as the eigenvector associated with the eigenvalue 1. The
transition matrix of this Markov process has a band matrix structure that can be exploited
to make the computation of the stationary distribution faster.
Model Transition
Solving the transition requires first solving the initial and final stationary equilibrium. The
number of periods for the transition is set to T=400. Let G = Gk×Gθ denote the grid over
capital and productivity type of the household, and let Φ denote a probability distribution
over G. The tolerance for the convergence of this problem is set to 10−6. The following
describes the procedure to solve for the transition.
(i) For a given path of aggregates, the value functions are solved backward from the final
stationary equilibrium to the first period, obtaining V2, . . . , VT .
(ii) Using this sequence of value functions, the initial stationary distribution Φ1 is rolled
forward.
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The following describes the generic forward-rolling step at time t, when Φt and Vt+1
are available, and for a given guess of prices, denoted
{
wˆt, Qˆt
}
.
(1) Given
{
wˆt, Qˆt
}
compute cash on hand available on G, that is for each z ∈ Gθ
yˆt (z) = Gk (1− δ) pxt + wˆt + pit
(
Gk, Qˆt, z
)
.
(2) Given Vt+1 and
{
wˆt, Qˆt
}
obtain policy function over G, gˆt
(
Vt+1, wˆt, Qˆt
)
, that
solves for each z ∈ Gθ
pxt u
′ (yˆt (z)− gˆt (z) pxt ) = βE (Vt+1 (z))′ .
(3) Given gˆt compute demand for labor and investment, and denote them lˆt and xˆt,
respectively.
(4) Given
{
lˆt, xˆt
}
and Φt compute excess demand for labor and intermediate good
ED
(
wˆt, Qˆt,Φt
)
.
(5) Find
{
wˆt, Qˆt
}
such that ED = 0 iterating over (1)-(5), and denote it
{
w¯t, Q¯t
}
,
so that the market clearing value function is denoted by g¯t
(
Vt+1, w¯t, Q¯t
)
.
(6) Given g¯t compute the discrete transition matrix—as in the previous section of
the appendix—and call it Tr.
(7) Compute
Φ¯t+1 = Tr× Φt
(iii) Step (ii) generates a new path of aggregates as substep (5) explains. Compare this
new path of aggregates with the initial one, used as input in step (i). If the maximum
difference is smaller than the tolerance then the code has converged. Otherwise,
iterate over steps (i)-(iii).
The solution of the transition with perfectly myopic agents is more involved because it
requires solving the problem showed above every time the price of investment changes and
surprises the agents.
Chapter 8
Conclusions
This paper discusses the consequences of the decline in the price of investment on wealth
inequality in the United States.
The paper shows that the decrease in the price of investment affects the saving be-
havior of households with different productivity types asymmetrically. In fact, productive
households respond by purchasing more capital than unproductive households, therefore
increasing wealth inequality.
This theory of the increase in wealth inequality reproduces half of the rise in wealth
concentration observed in the United States since the 1980s. Under the assumption that
investment specific technological progress stops in the 2010s, the model further predicts
that the increase in wealth inequality will vanish in the long run.
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